Jerry R. Skees(2010)通过研究认为,具有政府补贴的农业保险投入成本过大,问题较多,而且会导致潜在的低效率,如果从效率的角度衡量,政策性农业保险显然是失败的,因此农业保险是否需要政府介入还有待验证,他认为,美国模式并不是适合所有国家,美国农业保险模式还存在诸多问题,政府补贴成本过高在一定程度上会导致市场失灵,政府的角色应当是提供巨灾基金,建立风险援助机制,依靠市场来经营单一责任风险。
Bruce A. Babcock,Chad E Hart( 2011) 通过研究如何使政府的保费补贴效用最大化,指出如果政府实行无差别化的保险补贴,效果显然是无法使保费补贴效用最大化,他们建议应该对农民进行有效区分,分别从农业保险提供的保险责任和保障水平入手,对那些有效保险需求相对较低也更加贫困的农民给予更多保费补贴。认为政府加大对农业保费的补贴力度导致两方面的结果,一方面有助于农民购买保障水平更高的农业保险产品,另一方面农民购买高保障的农业保险产品可以消除高保费成本所带来的思想焦虑。
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